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Abstract: The increasing complexity of software development requires rigorously
defined domain specific modelling languages (dsml). Model-driven engineering
(mde) allows users to define their language’s syntax in terms of metamodels. Sev-
eral approaches for defining operational semantics of dsml have also been pro-
posed. These approaches allow, in principle, for model execution and for formal
analyses of the dsml. However, most of the time, the executions/analyses are per-
formed via transformations to other languages: code generation, resp. translation
to the input language of a model checker. The consequence is that the results (e.g.,
a program crash log, or a counterexample returned by a model checker) may not
be straightforward to interpret by the users of a dsml. In this research report, we
propose a formal and operational framework for tracing such results back to the
original dsml’s syntax and operational semantics.
Key-words: Model-driven engineering (MDE), model transformation, opera-
tional semantics, verification, bisimulation, tracing-back executions
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Remontée d’exécutions en terme de sémantique
opérationnelle de langage métier
Résumé : Le besoin en définitions rigoureuses de langages de modélisation métiers
(LMM) croît avec la complexitéé du développement logiciel. L’ingénierie dirigée
par les modèles (IDM), permet à des utilisateurs de définir la syntaxe de nouveaux
langages à l’aide de metamodèles. Quelques approches proposent également des
façons de définir la sémantique opérationnelle de ces langages. Ces approches
permettent, en principe, l’exécution des programmes (modèles) et leur analyse
formelle. Cependant, la plupart du temps, les analyses sont réalisées à l’aide de
transformations de ces modèles vers d’autres langages, pour être exécutés (lan-
gages généralistes, type C par exemple) ou vérifiés (langages d’entrées de model
checkers, de simulateurs, . . . ). En conséquence, ces résultats (un log de crash de
programme, une exécution contre exemple provenant de la vérification d’une pro-
priété par un model-checker, par exemple) peuvent ne pas être directement com-
préhensibles par les utilisateurs d’un LMM. Dans ce rapport, nous proposons une
méthode formelle et opérationnelle pour exprimer ces exécutions en terme de syn-
taxe et sémantique du LMM initial.
Mots-clés : Ingénierie dirigée par les modèles (IDM), transformation de modèles,
sémantique opérationnelle, vérification, bisimulation, remontée d’exécutions
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1 Introduction
The design of a Domain-Specific Modeling Language (dsml) involves the defi-
nition of a metamodel, which identifies the domain-specific concepts and the re-
lations between them. The metamodel formally defines the language’s abstract
syntax. Several works - [6, 11, 16], among others - have focused on how to help
users define operational semantics for their languages in order to enable model ex-
ecution and formal analyses such as model checking. Such analyses are especially
important when the domain addressed by a language is safety critical.
However, grounding a formal analysis on a dsml’s syntax and operational se-
mantics requires building a specific verification tool for each dsml; for example,
a model checker that “reads” the syntax of the dsml and “understands” the dsml’s
operational semantics. This is not realistic in practice.
Also, any realistic language will eventually have to be executed, and this usu-
ally involves code generation to some other language. Hence, model execution
and formal analyses are performed via transformations of the dsml to other target
languages (the language chosen for code generation, resp. the input language of a
model checker). The consequence is that execution/analysis results are typically
not readily understandable by the original dsml practitioners. Hence, there should
be a translation of the execution/analysis results into the original dsml.
In this paper we address the problem of formally tracing back results that are
finite executions of a target language (e.g., counterexamples to safety properties in
a model checker, or program crash logs) to an original dsml, thereby allowing the
dsml users to understand the results and to take action based on them.
Our approach is illustrated in Figure 1. A forward translation typically imple-
mented as a model transformation translates our dsml to a target language. Con-
sider then an execution of that language, represented at the bottom of Figure 1. The
back-tracing algorithm maps that execution to one that matches it in the original
dsml, according to its syntax and operational semantics. We formally define this
algorithm in the paper, and implement in an mde framework. The algorithm is pa-
rameterised by a relation R (depicted in Figure 1 using dashed lines) between states
of the dsml and states of the target language; and by a natural number n that (infor-
mally speaking) encodes a certain “difference in granularity” between executions
of the dsml and of the target language.
Forward Translation
Backward-Tracing Algorithm
(matching executions)
(model transformation)
dsml
Target Language
Figure 1:
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Our back-tracing algorithm works best if the model transformation implement-
ing the dsml-to-target-language translation has been formally verified in a theorem
prover (e.g., [5] presents such a formal verification). The property that is verified is
typically some kind of bisimulation relation, which implies that for every execution
of a dsml instance there exists a matching execution in the translation of the dsml
instance in the target language, and reciprocally. However, such theorem-proving
based approaches typically do not exhibit which executions match. Our algorithm
is complementary to such verifications because:
• our algorithm requires the parameters R and n as inputs, and one can rea-
sonably assume that these parameters characterise the bisimulation relation
against which the model transformations was verified; hence, our algorithm
benefits from that verification by obtaining two of its crucial inputs;
• our algorithm provides information that model transformation verification
does not: dsml executions that correspond to given target-language ones.
Also, by combining model transformation verification with our back-tracing algo-
rithms, we completely relieve dsml users of having to know anything about the
target language. This is important for such formal methods to be accepted in prac-
tice. A typical use of the combined approach by a dsml user would be:
• the user chooses a dsml instance and a safety property to be verified;
• the model transformation automatically maps the dsml instance and property
to the target language, here assumed to be the language of a model checker;
the checker runs automatically, producing the following output:
– either ok, meaning that the property holds on the dsml instance;
– or a counterexample, then automatically mapped to a dsml execution.
This is an interesting (in our opinion) combination of theorem proving (for model
transformation)/model checking (for model verification) in an mde framework.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate our
approach on an example (borrowed from [5]) of a process description language
called xspem, transformed into Prioritised Time Petri Nets for verification by model
checking. In Section 3 we present our back-tracing algorithm and formally prove
its correctness. In Section 4 we describe the implementation of the algorithm in
kermeta [11], and we show the results of the implementation on the example dis-
cussed in Section 2. In Section 5 we present related work, and we conclude and
suggest future work in Section 6.
2 Running Example
In this section we present our running example and briefly illustrate our approach
on it. The example is a dsml called xspem [1], an executable version of the spem
standard[14]. A transformation from xspem to Prioritised Time Petri Nets (PrTPN)
was defined in [5] in order to benefit from the Tina verification toolsuite [2]. They
have also proved (using the coq proof assistant) that this model transformation in-
duces a weak bisimulation between any xspemmodel’s behaviour and the behaviour
INRIA
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Activity
name: String
tmin: Int
tmax: Int
state: ActivityStateKind
timeState: TimeStateKind
startTime: Int
/currentTime: Int
startable():Bool
ﬁnishable():Bool
start()
ﬁnish()
WorkSequence
kind: WorkSequenceKind
<<enumeration>>
WorkSequenceKind
ﬁnishToStart
ﬁnishToFinish
startToStart
startToFinish
1
predecessor
linkToSuccessor 
0..* 
successor 
1
0..* 
linkToPredecessor
<<enumeration>>
ActivityStateKind
notStarted
started
ﬁnished
<<enumeration>>
TimeStateKind
ok
tooLate
tooEarly
undeﬁned
Process
globalTime: Int
   0..*          activities
   workSequences    0..* 
run()
incrementTime()
pA : Activity
tmin = 3
tmax = 6
state = notStarted
timeState = undeﬁned
startTime = 0
pB : Activity
tmin = 5
tmax = 7
state = notStarted
timeState = undeﬁned
startTime = 0
: Process
globalTime = 0
: WorkSequence
kind = ﬁnishToFinish
activitiesactivities
workSequences
successor
predecessor
 linkToSuccessor
linkToPredecessor
Figure 2: xSPEM (simplified) metamodel and a model example
of the corresponding PrTPN. This implies in particular that for every PrTPN P and
every execution of it returned by Tina - for instance, as a counterexample to a safety
property - there exists a matching execution in the xspem model that transforms to
P. However, their approach does not exhibit which xspem execution matches a
given PrTPN execution.
This is the problem we address in this paper, with a general approach that we
instantiate to the particular case of the xspem-to-PrTPN transformation.
In the rest of this section we briefly describe the xspem language (section 2.1):
its abstract syntax, defined by the metamodel shown in Figure 2, and its operational
semantics. After recalling a brief description of PrTPN (section 2.2), we illustrate
the model transformation on a simple instance (section 2.3). Finally, we show the
expected result of our algorithm on this example (section 2.4).
2.1 The xSPEM language and its operational semantics
In the metamodel of Figure 2 (left), an Activity represents a general unit of work
assignable to specific performers. Activities are ordered thanks to the WorkSe-
quence concept, whose attribute kind indicates when an activity can be started or
finished. The values of kind are defined by the WorkSequenceKind enumeration.
Values have the form stateToAction where state indicates the state of the work se-
quence’s source activity that allows to perform the action on the work sequence’s
target activity. For example, in the right-hand side of Figure 2, the two processes
pA and pB are linked by a WorkSequence of kind finishToFinish, which expresses
that pB will be allowed to complete its execution only when pA is finished. The
tmin and tmax attributes of the Activity class denote the minimum and, respectively,
the maximum duration of activities.
RR n° 7423
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Operational Semantics The following attributes and methods (written in bold
font in Figure 2) are used for defining the system’s state and operational semantics1.
An activity can be notStarted, inProgress, or finished (state attribute). When it is
finished an activity can be tooEarly, ok, or tooLate (timeState attribute), depending
on whether it has completed its execution in the intervals [0, tmin[, [tmin, tmax[,
or [tmax,∞[ respectively (all intervals are left-closed, right-open). The timeState
value is undefined while an activity is not finished.
Time is measured by a global clock, encoded by globalTime attribute of the
Process class, which is incremented by the incrementTime() method of the class.
The remaining attributes and methods are used to implement the state and time
changes for each activity; startTime denotes the starting moment of a given activ-
ity, and the derived attribute currentTime records (for implementation reasons) the
difference between globalTime and startTime (i.e., the current execution time of a
given activity). Finally, the startable() (resp. finishable()) methods check whether
an activity can be started (resp. finished), and the start() and finish() methods
change the activity’s state accordingly.
Definition 1 The state of an xspem model whose set of activities is A is the Carte-
sian product {globalTime} × Πa∈A(statea, timeStatea, currentTimea).
The initial state is {0} × Πa∈A{(notStarted, undefined, 0)}. The method run of the
Process class implements this initialisation (Figure 2). The transition relation con-
sists of the following transitions, implemented by the following methods:
• for each activity a ∈ A, the two transitions shown in Figure 3. The first one
starts the activity (implemented by the method start of the Activity class)
and the second one finishes it (implemented by the method finish). An ac-
tivity can be started whenever it is not yet activated and when its associated
constraints (written in the ocl language in Figure 3) are satisfied. These
constraints are implemented in the startable() and finishable() methods of
the metamodel. Note that the second transition’s definition has three cases
depending on the value of currentTimea and the time bounds of the activity.
• the method incrementTime of Process increments the globalTime. It can be
called at any moment. The values of currentTimea are derived accordingly.
2.2 Prioritised Time Petri Nets
We translate xspem to Prioritised Time Petri Nets (PrTPN) for model checking.
A Petri Net (PN) example is shown in the left-hand side of Figure 4. Let us
quickly and informally recall their vocabulary and semantics. A PN is composed
of places and transitions, connected by oriented Arcs. A marking is a mapping
from places to natural numbers, expressing the number of tokens in each place
(represented by bullet in a place). A transition is enabled in a marking when all its
1Defining state and operational semantics using attributes and methods is consistent with the
Kermeta framework [11], which we use for implementing our approach.
INRIA
Formally Tracing Execution Back 7
∀ws ∈ a.linkToPredecessor,
(ws.linkType = startToS tart && ws.predecessor.state = {inProgress, f inished})
|| (ws.linkType = f inishedToS tart && ws.predecessor.state = f inished)
(notS tarted, unde f ined, currentTimea)
start
−→ (inProgress, tooEarly, 0)
∀ws ∈ a.linkToPredecessor,
(ws.linkType = startToFinished && ws.predecessor.state ∈ {inProgress, f inished})
|| (ws.linkType = f inishedToFinished && ws.predecessor.state = f inished)
if currentTimea < tmin then
(inProgress, tooEarly, currentTimea)
f inish
−→ ( f inished, tooEarly, currentTimea)
if currentTimea ∈ [tmin, tmax[ then
(inProgress, ok, currentTimea)
f inish
−→ ( f inished, ok, currentTimea)
if currentTimea ≥ tmax then
(inProgress, tooLate, currentTimea)
f inish
−→ ( f inished, tooLate, currentTimea)
Figure 3: Event-based Transition Relation for Activities
p0 p2
p1
t1
2
 
 
 
p0 p2
p1
t1
t2
 
 
]1,∞]
[0,∞]
Figure 4: A Petri Net and a Prioritised Time Petri Net
predecessor (a.k.a. input) places contain at least the number of tokens specified by
the arc connecting the place to the transition (1 by default when not represented). If
this is the case then the transition can be fired, thereby removing the number of to-
kens specified by the input arc from each of its input places, and adding the number
of tokens specified by the output arc to each of its successor (a.k.a. output) places.
However, there is an exception to this transition-firing rule: if an input place is con-
nected by a read-arc (denoted by a black circle) to a transition, then the number of
tokens in this place remains unchanged when the transition is fired. An execution
of a Petri Net is then a sequence of markings and transitions m0, t1,m1, . . . , tn,mn
(for n ≥ 0) starting from a given initial marking m0, such that each marking mi
is obtained by firing the transition ti from the marking mi−1 (for i = 0, . . . , n) ac-
cording to the transition-firing rule. A deadlock is a marking where no transition is
enabled.
Next, Time Petri Nets are Petri Nets in which each transition ti is associated
to a firing interval, with non-negative rational end-points. Executions are now se-
quences of the form (m0, τ0), t1, (m1, τ1) . . . , tn, (mn, τn) (for n ≥ 0), starting from
a given initial marking m0 at time τ0 = 0, and such that each marking mi is ob-
tained by firing the transition ti at time τi from the marking mi−1 (for i = 1, . . . , n)
according to the transition-firing rule. Finally, Prioritised Time Petri Nets (PrTPN)
RR n° 7423
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allows for priorities between transitions. When two transitions can both be fired at
the same time, the one that is actually fired is the one that has larger priority (the
priorities denoted by dotted arrows in the right-hand side of Figure 4). The precise
semantics of PrTPN is defined in [3].
2.3 A Transformation from xSPEM to PrTPN
In [5], Combemale et al. defined a model transformation from xspem to PrTPN. We
illustrate this transformation by presenting its output when given as input the xspem
model shown in the right-hand side of Figure 2. The result is shown in Figure 5.
Each Activity is translated into seven places:
• Three places characterise the value of state attribute (NotStarted, InProgress,
Finished). One additional place called Started is added to record that the
activity has been started (and may either be inProgress or finished).
• The three remaining places characterise the value of the time attribute: tooEarly
when the activity ends before tmin, tooLatewhen the activity ends after tmax,
and ok when the activity ends in due time.
Four transitions govern the behaviour of the modeled activity. We rely on the use
of priorities among transitions to soundly deal with temporal constraints. As an
example, the deadline transitions are given priority over the finish ones 5. This
encodes the fact that the termination interval [tmin, tmax[ is right-open.
Finally, a WorkSequence instance becomes a read-arc from one place of the
source activity, to a transition of the target activity according to the linkKind at-
tribute of the WorkSequence. In our example, linkKind equals finishToFinish,
meaning that pA has to complete its execution before pB finishes; hence, the read-
arc from the pA_finished place to the pB_finish transition.
2.4 An illustration of our Back-Tracing Algorithm
The PrTPN obtained from the transformation of a given xspem model can be anal-
ysed by the Tina model checker. For example, to exhibit an execution where both
activities end is due time, we give the following formula to Tina:
¬ (pA_ f inished ∧ pA_ok ∧ pB_ f inished ∧ pB_ok)
The tool responds false and returns a counter example as a PrTPN execution
(for sake of simplicity, the markings mi are not detailed here):
(m_0,0),pA_start,(m_1,0),pA_lock,(m_2,3),pA_finish,(m_3,3),
pB_start,(m_4,3),pB_lock,(m_5,8),pB_finish,(m_6,8).
That is, a state of the PrTPN is a pair consisting of a marking and of a time-
stamp. Transitions are fired between states at their respective time-stamps: pA_start
fires at time 0, then pA_lock, pA_finish and pB_start fire in sequence at time 3,
and finally pB_lock and pB_finish fire in sequence at time 8.
INRIA
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pA notStarted pA inProgress pA finished
pA started
pA tooEarly pA ok pA tooLate
pB notStarted pB inProgress pB finished
pB started
pB tooEarly pB ok pB tooLate
[0,∞[[0,∞[
[3, 3] [3, 3]
 
 
pB
pA
[0,∞[[0,∞[
[5, 5] [2, 2]
 
 
 pA start pA finish
pA lock pA deadline
pB start pB finish
pB lock pB deadline
Figure 5: PrTPN obtained from the xspem model in Figure 2 (right). The initial
marking has one token in each of the pA_notS tarted and pB_notS tarted places.
Our back-tracing algorithm (cf. Section 3.3) takes this input together with
a simulation relation R between xspem and PrTPN states, and a natural-number
bound n that captures the difference in granularity between xspem and PrTPN exe-
cutions. Two states are in the relation R if
• their globalTime and time-stamp components are equal
• for each activity, the value of its state attribute is encoded by token in the
corresponding place of the PrTPN,
• hen an activity is finished, the value of its timeState attribute is encoded by a
token in the corresponding place of the PrTPN (cf. Section 2.3)
For instance, A.state = notStarted is encoded by a token in the pA_nonStarted
place; and similarly for the inProgress and finished state values; and A.timeState = ok
is encoded by a token in the pA_ok place; and similarly for the tooEarly and tooLate
time state values. Regarding the bound n, it is here set to 5 - because in xspem exe-
cutions globalTime advances by at most one time unit, but in the given PrTPN exe-
RR n° 7423
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cution, the maximum difference between two consecutive time-stamps is 5 = 8−3.
Then, our algorithm returns the following xspem execution:
globalT ime xspem states : (statei, timeS tatei, currentT imei)
i = pA i = pB
0 (notS tarted, unde f ined, 0) (notS tarted, unde f ined, 0)
0 (inProgress, tooEarly, 0) (notS tarted, unde f ined, 0)
3 (inProgress, ok, 3) (notS tarted, unde f ined, 0)
3 ( f inished, ok, 3) (notS tarted, unde f ined, 0)
3 ( f inished, ok, 3) (inProgress, tooEarly, 0)
8 ( f inished, ok, 3) (inProgress, ok, 5)
8 ( f inished, ok, 3) ( f inished, ok, 8)
Note that indeed both processes finish in due time: pA starts at 0 and finishes
at 3 (its tmin = 3); and pB starts at 3 and finishes at 8 (its tmin = 5 = 8 − 3).
3 Formalising the Problem of Tracing Executions
In this section we formally define our algorithm and prove its correctness. We start
by recapping the definition of transition systems and give a notion of matching an
execution of a transition system with a given (abstract) sequence of states, modulo
a given relation between states. We then identify where the elements of our frame-
work (i.e., the dsml, the target language, . . . ) stand in this picture, and formally
state our backwards tracing problem. We identify a reasonably restricted solvable
sub-problem, and propose and prove an algorithm for solving it.
3.1 Transition systems and execution matching
Definition 2 (transition system) A transition system is a tuple A = (A, ainit,→A)
where A is a possibly infinite set of states, ainit is the initial state, and→A⊆ A × A
is the transition relation.
Notations: N is the set of natural numbers. We write a→A a′ for (a, a′) ∈→A.
An execution is a sequence of states ρ = a0, . . . an ∈ A, for some n ∈ N, such that
ai →A ai+1 for i = 0, . . . , n − 1; length(ρ) = n is the length of the execution ρ.
Executions of length 0 are states. We denote by exec(a) the subset of executions
that start in the state a, i.e., the set of executions ρ ofA such that ρ(0) = a.
Definition 3 (R-matching) Given a transition systems B = (B, binit,→B), a set A
with A ∩ B = ∅, an element ainit ∈ A, a relation R ⊆ A × B, and two sequences
ρ ∈ ainitA
∗, π ∈ exec(b), we say that ρ is R-matched by π if there exists a (possibly,
non strict) increasing function α : [0, . . . , length(ρ)] → N with α(0) = 0, such that
for all i ∈ [0, . . . , length(ρ)], (ai, bα(i)) ∈ R.
INRIA
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a1 a2 a3 a4a0 a5
pi
ρ
R
b0 b2 b4 b5b1 b3
Figure 6: R-matching of sequences. The relation R is represented by dashed lines.
Example 1 In Figure 6 we represent two sequences ρ and π. A relation R is denoted
using dashed lines. The function α : [0, . . . , 5] → N defined by α(i) = 0 for
i ∈ [0, 3], α(4) = 1, and α(5) = 5 ensures that ρ is R-matched by π.
3.2 Formalising our framework
In our framework, B = (B, binit,→B) is the transition system denoting a dsml L
(in our running example, xspem) and its operational semantics, with binit being the
initial state of a particular instance m ∈ L (in our example, the model depicted in
the right-hand side of Figure 2). The instance m is transformed by some model
transformation φ (in our example, the model transformation defined in [5]) to a
target language (say, L′; in our example, PrTPN, the input language of the Tina
model checker). About L′, we only assume that it has a notion of state and that it
state-space is a given set A. Then, ρ ∈ ainitA∗ is the execution of the tool that we
are trying to match, where ainit is the initial state of the instance φ(m) ∈ L′ (here,
the PrTPN illustrated in Figure 5 with the initial marking specified in the figure).
The relation R can be thought of as a matching criterion between states of a dsml
and those of the target language; it has to be specified by users of our back-tracing
algorithm.
Remark 1 We do not assume that the operational semantics of L′ is known. This
is important, because is saves us the effort of giving operational semantics to the
target language, which can be quite hard. Also, we do not need that the transla-
tion between L and L′ be implemented using a model transformation, although
this is convenient if the dsml L is defined using a metamodel (which it most often
is). Finally, even if the translation is indeed implemented using a model trans-
formation, we do not need to know that the transformation is a bisimulation to
apply our back-tracing algorithm; indeed, we only need the transformation’s out-
put on a given input. However, if the transformation was verified - i,e, that R a
n-bisimulation between dsml and target - meaning that to each execution in each
dsml instance there exists a (n,R)-matching execution in the instance’s traslation to
the target language, and reciprocally - then we obtain the interesting (in our opin-
ion) combination of theorem proving (for model transformation)/model checking
(for model verification) described in Section 1.
RR n° 7423
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3.3 The back-tracing problem
Our back-tracing problem can now be formally stated as follows: given
• a transition system B = (B, binit,→B)
• a set A, an element ainit ∈ A, and a sequence ρ ∈ ainitA∗
• a relation R ⊆ A × B,
Algorithm 1 Return an execution π ∈ exec(binit) of B that (n,R)-matches the
longest prefix of a sequence ρ ∈ ainitA∗ that can be (n,R)-matched.
Require: B = (B, binit,→B); A; ainit ∈ A; ρ ∈ ainitA∗; n ∈ N; R ⊆ A × B
Local Variable: α : [0..length(ρ)]→ N; π ∈ B∗; S , S ′ ⊆ B; ℓ ∈ N
1: if (ainit, binit) < R then
2: return ε
3: else
4: α(0)← 0, k ← 0, π ← binit, S ← {binit}
5: while k < length(ρ) and S , ∅ do
6: k ← k + 1
7: S ′ ← R(ρ(k))∩ →n
B
(last(π))
8: if S ′ , ∅ then
9: Choose πˆ ∈ exec(last(π))
such that ℓ = length(πˆ) ≤ n and πˆ(ℓ) ∈ S ′ ⊲ ℓ can be 0
10: α(k)← α(k − 1) + ℓ
11: πα(k−1)+1..α(k) ← πˆ1..l ⊲ effect of this assignment is null if ℓ = 0
12: end if
13: S ← S ′
14: end while;
15: return π
16: end if
does there exist an execution π ∈ exec(binit) such that ρ is R-matched by π; and
if this is the case, then, construct such an execution π.
Unfortunately, this problem is not decidable/solvable. This is because an ex-
ecution π that R-matches a sequence ρ can be arbitrarily long; the function α in
Definition 3 is responsible for this. One way to make the problem decidable is
to impose that, in Definition 3, the function α satisfies a “bounded monotonicity
property" : ∀i ∈ [0, length(ρ) − 1] α(i + 1) − α(i) ≤ n for some given n ∈ N. In this
way, the candidate executions π that may match ρ become finitely many.
Definition 4 ((n,R)-matching) With the notations of Definition 3, and given a nat-
ural number n ∈ N we say that the sequence ρ is (n,R)-matched by the execution π
if the function α satisfies ∀i ∈ [0, length(ρ) − 1] α(i + 1) − α(i) ≤ n.
In Example 1 (Figure 6), ρ is (5,R)-matched (but not (4,R)-matched) by π.
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a0 b0
a1
a2
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b1
b2
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b4
b5
Bρ
Figure 7: Attempting to match execution ρ.
3.4 Back-tracing algorithm
For a set S ⊆ A of states of a transition system A, we denote by→n
A
(S ) (n ∈ N)
the set of states {a′ ∈ A|∃a ∈ S .∃ρ ∈ exec(a). length(ρ) ≤ n ∧ ρ(length(ρ)) = a′};
it is the set of successors of states in S by executions of length at most n. Also, for
a relation R ⊆ A × B and a ∈ A we denote by R(a) the set {b ∈ B|(a, b) ∈ R}. We
denote the empty sequence by ε, whose length is undefined; and, for a nonempty
sequence ρ, we let last(ρ) , ρ(length(ρ)) denote its last element.
Theorem 1 (Algorithm for matching executions) Consider a transition systemB =
(B, binit,→B), a set A with A∩B = ∅, an element ainit ∈ A, a relation R ⊆ A×B, and
a natural number n ∈ N. Consider also a sequence ρ ∈ ainitA
∗. Then, Algorithm 1
returns an execution π ∈ exec(binit) of B that (n,R) matches the longest prefix of ρ
that can be (n,R)-matched.
The proof of Theorem 1: is given in the Appendix. In particular, if there exists
an execution in exec(binit) that (n,R)-matches the whole sequence ρ then our back-
tracing algorithm returns one; otherwise, the algorithm says there is none.
Example 2 We illustrate several runs of our algorithm on the execution ρ depicted
in the left-hand side of Figure 7, with the transition system B depicted in the right-
hand side of the figure, and the relation R depicted using dashed lines. Let first
the bound n = 3 in the algorithm. The set S is initialised to S = {b0}. For the
first step of the algorithm - i.e., when k = 1 in the while loop - we choose b = b0
and the execution πˆ = b0; we obtain α(1) = 0, π(0) = b0 and S ′ = R(a1) ∩
{b0, b1, b2, b3, b4} = {b0, b1, b2}. At the second step, we choose b = b0 and, say,
πˆ = b0, b2; we obtain α(2) = 1, π(1) = b2 and S ′ = R(a2) ∩ {b2, b3, b4, b5} = {b2}.
At the third step, we can only choose b = b2 and πˆ = b2, b3, b4, b5; we obtain
α(3) = 4, π2..4 = πˆ, and S ′ = {b5}, and now we are done: the matching execution
π for ρ is π = b0, b2 . . . b5. Note that our non-deterministic algorithm is allowed to
make the “most inspired choices” as above. A deterministic algorithm may make
“less inspired choices” and backtrack from them; for example, had we chosen
πˆ = b0, b1 at the second step, we would have ended up failing locally because of
the impossibility of matching the last step a2a3 of ρ; backtracking to πˆ = b0, b2
solves this problem. Finally, note that with n < 3, the algorithm fails globally - it
cannot match the last step of ρ.
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Remark 2 The implementation of our algorithm amounts to implementing non-
deterministic choice via state-space exploration. A natural question that arises is
then: why not use state-space exploration to perform the model checking itself,
instead of using an external model checker and trying to match its result (as we
propose to do)? One reason is that it is typically more efficient to use the exter-
nal model checker to come up with an execution, and to match that execution with
our algorithm, instead performing model checking using our (typically, less effi-
cient) state-space exploration. Another reason is that the execution we are trying
to match may be produced by something else than a model checker, e.g., a program
crash log can also serve as an input to our algorithm.
4 Implementation
Our implementation takes as input an execution given by the Tina toolsuite and
returns as output an execution of the (initial) xspem model.
4.1 A generic implementation using Kermeta
Kermeta is a language for specifying metamodels, models, and model transfor-
mations that are compliant to the Meta Object Facility (mof) standard [12]. The
abstract syntax of a dsml is specified by means of meta-models possibly enriched
with constraints written in an ocl-like language [13] Kermeta also proposes an
imperative language for describing the operational semantics of dsml [11].
SimulationTree
deep: Int
SimulationTree(uriSourceTrace: String, uriInitialState: String)
ﬁndStates(next: SourceState, current: TargetState): OrderedSet<TargetState>
simulationRelation(s: SourceState, t: TargetState): Boolean
oneMatchingTrace(): OrderedSet<TargetState>
SimulationTreeNode
*   child
0..1
parent
root      1
Execution
(from PrTPN) 
trace     1
SourceState
source       1
TargetState 
execute(): OrderedSet<TargetState>
{ordered}
*            target
SourceExecution 
State
(from PrTPN) 
Process
(from xSPEM) 
*
states
xSPEM
.kmt
xSPEM
.ecore
PrTPN 
.ecore
Simulation
Tree.kmt
TraceMatching
PrTPN2xSPEM
.kmt
<<require>>
<<require>>
<<require>>
<<require>>
Figure 8: The generic SimulationTree class (left) and how to use it (right).
We implement in Kermeta a deterministic version of the non-deterministic Al-
gorithm 1. Accordingly, our implementation relies on a generic tree-based struc-
ture (cf. Figure 8, left). The algorithm is generically defined in the SimulationTree
method of the SimulationTree class. To use this method, the SourceExecution and
its sequence of SourceState have to be specialised by an execution coming from the
verification tool, and the TargetState have to be specialised by the corresponding
concept in the dsml.
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The SimulationTree method builds a tree, by calling at each tree node the
method findStates to find the set of target states that simulate the next source state,
according to the current target state and the operational semantics. This method
depends on a given relation R defined in the method simulationRelation between
sourceState and targetState. It also depends on a given maximal depth of search
(n in Algorithm 1) defined by the attribute deep. Once the simulation tree is built,
a dsml execution that simulates the execution provided by the verification tool can
be generated by the method oneMatchingTrace.
4.2 On the example
One key feature of Kermeta is its ability to weave into a single metamodel, using
the require keyword, existing metamodels, constraints, structural elements (meta-
classes, classes, properties, and operations), and functionalities. This feature offers
flexibility and modularity to developers by enabling them to easily manipulate and
reuse existing metamodels.
Moreover, the static introduction operator aspect allows one to define these
various aspects in separate units and to integrate them automatically into the meta-
model. The composition is performed statically and the composed metamodel is
typechecked to ensure the safe integration of all units.
We use both model weaving and static introduction to specialise our generic
implementation of Algorithm 1 (as described previously) to the particular context
of getting the xspem executions from a PrTPN execution. As described in Figure
8 (right), the TraceMatchingPrTPN2xSPEM.kmt program weaves the xspem meta-
model (xSPEM.ecore) and its operation semantics (xSPEM.kmt), together with a
metamodel for PrTPN (PrTPN.ecore) and our generic implementation for Algo-
rithm 1 (SimulationTree.kmt). In addition to weaving the different artifacts, Trace-
MatchingPrTPN2xSPEM.kmt also defines the links between them. Thus we define
the inheritance relations (cf. Figure 8, left) between Execution (from PrTPN.ecore)
and SourceExecution, between State (from PrTPN.ecore) and SourceState, and be-
tween Process (from xSPEM.ecore) and TargetState. We also define the relation R
by specialising the method simulationRelation) and the value of the attribute deep.
Thus, TraceMatchingPrTPN2xSPEM.kmt may be used for a given execution
of PrTPN conforming to PrTPN.ecore, in our case, the Tina execution obtained in
Section 2.4). As Tina only provides textual output, we had to parse and pretty-
print it in the right format (XMI - XML Metadata Interchange). This was done
in Ocaml. After running the method SimulationTree, we obtain using the method
oneMatchingTrace the following output (and its corresponding model) :
5 Related work
The problem of tracking executions from a given target back to a domain-specific
language has been addressed in several papers of the mde community. Most of
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Figure 9: Output on the given example
the proposed methods are either dedicated to only one pair metamodel/verification
tool ([8], [10]) or they compute an “explanation” of the execution in a more abstract
way (e.g., in [7], where the abstract formalism is Message Sequence Charts). In [9],
the authors propose a general method based on a traceability mechanism of model
transformations. It relies on a relation between elements of the source and the
target metamodel, implemented by means of annotations in the transformation’s
source codes. This relation is essentially structural (syntactical) - it is not formally
related to the dsml’s operational semantics. By contrast, our approach does not
need any instrumentation of the model transformations code, and most importantly,
it is formally grounded on operationally semantics, a feature that allows us to prove
its correctness.
In the formal methods area, Translation Validation ([15]) has also the purpose
of validating a compiler by performing a verification after each run of the compiler
to ensure that the output code produced by the compilation is a correct transla-
tion of the source program. The method is fully automatic for the developer, who
has no additional information to provide in order to prove the translation: all the
semantics of the two languages and the relation between states are embedded in-
side the “validator” (thus it cannot be generic). Contrary to our work, Translation
Validation only focus on proving correctness, and does not provide any useful in-
formation if the verification fails. Finally, the Counterexample-Guided Abstraction
Refinement (CEGAR) verification method ([4]) also consists in matching model-
checking counterexamples to program executions. However, CEGAR attempts to
match more “abstract” executions to more “concrete” ones, whereas we currently
do the opposite.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
dsml are often translated to other languages for efficient execution and/or analysis.
We address the problem of formally tracing executions of a given target language
tool back into an execution of a dsml. Our solution is an algorithm that requires that
the dsml’s semantics be defined formally, and that a relation R be defined between
states of the dsml and of the target language. The algorithm also takes as input a
natural-number bound n, which estimates the maximum “difference of granularity”
between semantics of the dsml and of the target language. Then, given an finite
execution ρ of the target language (e.g., a counterexample to a safety property, or
INRIA
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program crash log), our algorithm returns a (n,R) matching execution π in terms
of the dsml’s operational semantics - if there is one - or it reports that no such
execution exists, otherwise.
We illustrate our algorithm on an example where the dsml is xspem, a timed
language of activities and processes, and the target language is Prioritised Time
Petri Nets (PrTPN), the input language of the Tina model checker. We implement
our algorithm in Kermeta, a framework for defining operational semantics of dsml
and model transformations between dsml.
Regarding future work, the main direction is to exploit the combination the-
orem proving (for model transformation)/model checking (for model verification)
described in the introduction. Another orthogonal research direction is to optimise
our currently naive implementation in Kermeta in order to avoid copying whole
models when only parts of them (their “state”) change.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is based on the two following technical lemmas. The first one says that
matching is in some sense compositional.
Lemma 1 With the notations of Definition 4, for all sequences ρ, ρ′ ∈ A+ and exe-
cutions π, π′ of B such that ππ′ is also an execution of B, if π (n,R)-matches ρ and
π′ (n,R)-matches ρ′, then ππ′ (n,R)-matches ρρ′.
Proof : Let α : [0..length(ρ)] → N and α′ : [0..length(ρ′)] → N be the functions
in Definition 4, which ensure that π (n,R)-matches ρ and π′ (n,R)-matches ρ′.
To prove that ππ′ (n,R)-matches ρρ′ we use the function (αα′) : [0..length(ρ) +
length(ρ′)] → N defined by (αα′)(i) = α(i) if 0 ≤ i ≤ length(ρ), and (αα′)(i) =
α′(i − length(ρ) − 1) + 1 + α(length(ρ)) for length(ρ) < i ≤ length(ρ) + length(ρ′).
The second lemma states a useful invariant of our back-tracing algorithm.
Lemma 2 In Algorithm 1, just before Label 5, the following invariant holds: S ,
∅ =⇒ ρ0..k is (n,R)−matched by π0..α(k).
Proof : (sketch) For the base case: the first time the algorithm arrives at Label 5,
S = {binit} , ∅, k = 0, α(0) = 0; and ρ0..0 = ainit is matched by π0..0 = binit.
For the inductive step: assume that the statement holds for k = N, we prove it
for k = N+1. Consider the set S N+1 in out statement, i.e., for the k = N+1-th visit
of the algorithm at Label 5. We have S N+1 = R(ρ(N + 1))∩ →nB (πN(length(πN)))
thanks to the assignment at Label 7(lastN = πN(length(πN))). We have to prove
S N+1 , ∅ =⇒ ρ0..N+1 is (n,R)−matched by π0..α(N+1). Let then S N+1 , ∅. In the
algorithm, at the N + 1-th iteration, the condition S ′ , ∅ of the if stattement at
Label 8 evaluates to true; this is because, during that iteration S ′ = S N+1. Then,
the choose statement chooses an execution πˆ starting from the state π(last) (where
π ended at the last iteration) and ending in some state in S ′; and by construction of
that execution, πˆ1..l (n-R)-matches ρN..N+1. Hence, by compositionnality of match-
ing (Lemma 1), ρ0..N+1 is (n-R)-matched by π0..α(N)πˆ1..l. Finally, we notice that at
our point of interest - the N +1-th visit to Label 5 - we have π0..α(N)πˆ1..l = π0..α(N+1)
thanks to the assignments at Labels 10 and 11 during the N-th iteration. This con-
cludes the proof.
We are now ready to Prove Theorem 1, reproduced below for convenience.
Theorem 1 (Algorithm for matching executions) Consider a transition system
B = (B, binit,→B), a set Awith A∩B = ∅, an element ainit ∈ A, a relation R ⊆ A×B,
and a natural number n ∈ N. Consider also a sequence ρ ∈ ainitA∗. Then, Algorithm
1 returns an execution π ∈ exec(binit) ofB that (n,R) matches the longest prefix of ρ
that can be (n,R)-matched.
Proof : (Sketch) There are two cases, corresponding to the outermost if-then-else
statement in the algorithm. If (ainit, binit) < R then even the first state ainit of the
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sequence ρ cannot be matched. Hence, our procedure returns ε, i.e., the empty
sequence, which in the current situation is indeed the longest prefix of the ex-
ecution ρ that can be matched, and the proof is done in this case. Otherwise,
(ainit, binit) ∈ R. Now, assume that the algorithm is currently visiting Label 5 for
the last time - i.e., it “stands just before” its last (ever) evaluation of the condition
of the while loop. This means that the while loop’s condition evaluates to false.
Hence, k = length(ρ) or S = ∅. If k = length(ρ) and S , ∅ then using Lemma 2 we
obtain ρ0..length(ρ) is simulated by π0..α(length(ρ)), meaning that the whole sequence ρ
is simulated by the execution π returned by the algorithm, and the proof is done in
this case.
The remaining case is S = ∅. In this case, notice that the current visit to
Label 5 cannot be the first one, since at the first visit, S = {binit} , ∅. Hence,
there must have been a previous loop iteration, and at the corresponding previous
visit to Label 5, we had S , ∅. The previous visit to Label 5 corresponds to the
iteration N − 1, where N is the current value of k. Using Lemma 2 we obtain that
ρ0..N−1 is (n,R)−matched by π0..α(N−1). Since the iteration N − 1 was the last loop
iteration, the matching of ρ stopped at a prefix of length N − 1 < length(ρ), and
there is no further extension of the execution π to match “more” of the execution
ρ, and the proof of this case is done as well.
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